India has strategically employed its favorable geographic position along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and established a network of approximately half a dozen small outposts to effectively counteract potential Chinese incursions.
On Tuesday, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made a notable visit to the border region of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, where he performed a 'Shastra Puja' with the troops to commemorate the festival of Dussehra, symbolizing the triumph of good over evil. The timing of Singh's visit to the border region on Dussehra carries significant symbolic weight.
In December of the previous year, Indian forces successfully repelled a Chinese incursion in the Yangtse area of the Tawang sector. This success was attributed to improved tactical deployment, including the occupation of key ridge positions, enhanced preparedness, effective intelligence, and year-round presence at the existing outposts in the area.
However, recent commercial satellite imagery, obtained by India Today, suggests that China may have relocated its Combined Arms Brigade (CAB) positioned near the site of the clash at Lampung in Tsona Dzong to Ritang in Lhontse Dzong within a few months following the incident.
During his visit, Rajnath Singh was accompanied by Chief of the Army Staff General Manoj Pande, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) Eastern Command Lt Gen RP Kalita, and GOC, 4 Corps Lt Gen Manish Erry. The Defence Minister also had the opportunity to observe some of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) posts across the border from Bum La.
India has made effective use of its strategically advantageous position along the ridgeline and maintained a network of roughly half a dozen small outposts to counter possible Chinese incursions. However, in recent times, China has invested in building roads and new garrisons in the immediate border areas to enhance its strategic positioning. The permanent or semi-permanent deployment of additional Chinese troops in the region could potentially undermine India's historically perceived advantages.
It's worth noting that the US Department of Defense, in its most recent annual report to Congress, highlighted China's deployment of three light-to-medium Combined Arms Brigades (CABs) in the eastern sector of the LAC, underscoring the evolving dynamics in the region.
In response to the reported clashes in the border area of Arunachal Pradesh on December 13, 2022, both the Indian and Chinese governments issued separate statements. While both sides accused each other of crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and reported subsequent disengagement, Rajnath Singh confirmed the clash while addressing the Parliament, stating that there were "no fatalities or serious casualties on our side." The Chinese statement did not mention any clashes.
This incident was not an isolated one, as a similar clash had been reported a year prior, with video footage of the incident circulating on social media shortly after the December 2022 confrontation.
Analysts who monitor the Indo-Tibetan border areas have identified a broader trend linking various developments in this region. They have analyzed recent imagery obtained by India Today, which suggests an increased deployment of PLA assets in the eastern frontier of Indo-Tibetan border areas compared to the pre-Galwan clash period.
According to Nature Desai, an observer of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, these developments indicate a shift in China's strategic calculations regarding the Indian border. The construction of a dual-use airport in Lhontse Dzong, near the McMahon Line and Tawang, has significantly altered the regional status quo. China appears to be reinforcing its force deployment along the Tibet-Arunachal Pradesh border areas to gain an advantage in terms of infrastructure, communication, and logistics compared to India.
The ongoing deployment of the CAB at Ritang in Lhontse County, as revealed by recent high-resolution imagery, suggests a sustained presence in this area for nearly a year.
Analysts argue that China's actions are aligned with President Xi Jinping's policy, as articulated in his speech at the 20th Party Congress, where he emphasized the PLA's goal of winning "local wars" in the coming years. China's assertive actions along the LAC should be viewed in this context, as it reflects its long-term strategy to avoid a two-front war dilemma.
Questions have arisen regarding the recent removal of China's Defense Minister Li Shangfu and whether it may impact Xi's defense strategies. Li was known for his expertise in military technology, and his removal could potentially affect the morale of the PLA. This may not have immediate consequences but could hinder Xi's long-term plans for the PLA and its activities along the LAC.
While India continues its infrastructure development in the border regions at its own pace, China experts emphasize the importance of "non-military measures." Initiatives such as India's "vibrant villages" scheme for infrastructure development near the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh and recent border tourism initiatives play a crucial role in strengthening India's position in the region.
In conclusion, the border situation between India and China remains complex, and recent developments suggest shifting dynamics in the Indo-Tibetan border areas, with China enhancing its presence and infrastructure. The resolution of the boundary dispute remains a challenge, with China displaying a selective approach to border settlement, which has resulted in ongoing stand-offs and tensions in the region.
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