Decisions and the IC-814 hijacking: A former R&AW head outlines what went wrong


The 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 has once again become a focal point of public debate, reignited by the release of a Netflix mini-series that portrays the dramatic and tragic events surrounding the incident. This series has not only stirred controversy due to its portrayal of the crisis but has also prompted renewed scrutiny of the decisions—or lack thereof—made by key figures in the Indian government and security apparatus at the time. 

The hijacking itself remains one of the most harrowing episodes in India’s recent history. On December 24, 1999, five terrorists took control of the Kathmandu-to-Delhi flight shortly after it entered Indian airspace. The plane, carrying 176 passengers and crew members, was diverted to Amritsar, where it made an unscheduled landing for refueling. The hijackers, part of the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, demanded the release of three high-profile militants imprisoned in India: Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar. What followed was a tense and tragic standoff that played out over several days, culminating in a prisoner exchange that left a lasting scar on the nation's psyche.

AS Dulat, the former chief of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), who was at the helm of the intelligence agency during the hijacking, has offered a rare and candid admission of the failures in decision-making that characterized the government's response to the crisis. Speaking to India Today TV, Dulat did not shy away from acknowledging the mistakes made during the crucial early hours when the plane was grounded in Amritsar. "Once the plane landed in Amritsar, we had an opportunity to make sure that it didn't leave Indian territory," Dulat said, reflecting on what many see as a missed chance to end the hijacking before it escalated. He added, "But when it left Amritsar, there was no other option but to make a deal. We did the best possible deal with the best possible negotiators."

Dulat's remarks highlight the indecision that plagued the response at multiple levels of government and security. The 50 minutes that the plane spent on the tarmac in Amritsar presented a critical window of opportunity for Indian authorities to take control of the situation. Yet, despite the presence of Punjab Police and central intelligence forces, no action was taken to prevent the aircraft from taking off again. This failure has been a point of contention and regret for many involved in the incident.

In his interview, Dulat recounted a conversation he had with Sarabjit Singh, the then Director General of Police (DGP) for Punjab, who was responsible for managing the situation on the ground. Singh, who was under immense pressure, expressed his reluctance to take unilateral action without explicit instructions from higher authorities. "I had a long chat with the Punjab DGP who told me that he was not KPS Gill, and he was not going to put his job on the line," Dulat recalled, referring to the legendary police officer KPS Gill, known for his tough stance on terrorism. Singh reportedly told Dulat that the Chief Minister of Punjab, Parkash Singh Badal, had made it clear that he did not want any bloodshed in Amritsar, a sentiment echoed by officials in Delhi. "The DGP said they could storm the plane but they didn't know how many casualties could happen. So in the name of bloodshed, nobody wanted to take a call," Dulat explained.

This indecision, as Dulat noted, stemmed from a lack of clear directives from Delhi. Despite the severity of the situation, there was no consensus on how to proceed, leaving those on the ground in a state of paralysis. The former RAW chief acknowledged that the Punjab Police needed to be instructed to ensure that the plane did not leave Amritsar, but these instructions never came. Dulat also agreed with DGP Singh's assessment that clear instructions from Delhi could have made a difference, though he admitted uncertainty about what Singh might have done if such orders had been issued. "I agree with him. But what he would have done, I don't know. He was right when he said he was waiting for instructions from Delhi which never happened," Dulat said.

The consequences of this indecision were dire. After leaving Amritsar, the plane made stops in Lahore and Dubai before finally landing in Kandahar, Afghanistan, then under Taliban control. The Taliban, while publicly maintaining a stance of neutrality, effectively acted as intermediaries, further complicating the situation. Throughout the six-day ordeal, the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, faced mounting pressure from the families of the hostages and the broader public. In the end, India agreed to release the three militants in exchange for the safe return of the passengers and crew, a decision that has been the subject of intense debate and criticism ever since.

Dulat's recent revelations add another layer to the complex and painful history of the IC-814 hijacking. His acknowledgment of "goof-ups" in the decision-making process underscores the challenges and limitations faced by those in power during the crisis. The Netflix series, by bringing these events back into the spotlight, has not only rekindled memories of that fateful December but has also sparked renewed discussion about accountability, leadership, and the lessons learned—or not learned—from one of India's darkest hours. As the nation reflects on the past, the story of IC-814 serves as a somber reminder of the high stakes involved in matters of national security and the profound impact of decisions made under pressure.


 

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